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Abstract
In contrast to the existing literature on repeated games that assumes a ￿xed discount
factor, I study an environment in which it is more realistic to assume a ￿uctuating
discount factor. In a repeated oligopoly, as the interest rate changes, so too does the
degree to which ￿rms discount the future. I characterize the optimal tacit collusion
equilibrium when the discount factor changes over time, under both price and quantity
competition, and I show that collusive prices and pro￿ts depend not only on the level
of the discount factor but also on its volatility. Collusive prices and pro￿ts increase
with a higher discount factor level, but decrease with its volatility. These results have
important implications not only for the study of cooperation in repeated games but also
for empirical studies of collusive pricing and the role that collusive pricing may play in
economic cycles.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is well known that oligopolies can use the threat of future price wars to sustain prices
above competitive levels if ￿rms care enough about the future (Friedman [11]). The
extent to which ￿rms care about the future depends primarily on the interest rate if the
￿rms￿ objective is to maximize the present value of pro￿ts. The ￿rms￿ discount factor
may also depend on other (secondary) forces such as the probability that the product
may become obsolete. Given that the interest rate and other variables that aﬀect the
discount factor are constantly changing, it is important to study tacit collusion under
discount factor ￿uctuations.
I characterize collusive prices and pro￿ts when the discount factor changes over time,
under both price and quantity competition, and I show that collusive prices and pro￿ts
increase with both present and future levels of the discount factor, but decrease with its
volatility. These results have important implications not only for the study of collusion
but also for repeated game theory in general.
Repeated game theory has until now largely considered the discount factor as a
￿xed preference parameter1. Oligopoly games are one example among many of an en-
vironment in which it is natural to assume that the discount factor changes over time.
Another example would be exogenous changes in the probability that a partnership
might end. Thus, the volatility of the discount factor may be an important determinant
of cooperation for many kinds of repeated games, not just oligopoly.
With respect to the study of collusion, previous literature has looked at the eﬀect of
demand ￿uctuations on prices, but not discount factor ￿uctuations. In a seminal paper,
Rotemberg and Saloner [22] show that collusive prices may be countercyclical. In this
paper, I not only introduce the role of volatility to the repeated game theory literature
but I also show that under discount factor ￿uctuations the results are less ambiguous
1The exception is Baye and Jansen [4] that provides folk theorem results for repeated games with
stochastic discount factors.
2and more robust than under demand ￿uctuations. This paper also presents several new
comparative static results that can be used in empirical studies of collusive pricing. In
addition, this paper underscores the role of interest rates and imperfect competition
in aggregate ￿uctuations. Any change in policy, technology or preferences that aﬀects
the real interest rate (either in level or volatility) may have an impact on aggregate
production through changes in collusive behavior.
T h ee n v i r o n m e n t sIs t u d ya n dt h es p e c i ￿cr e s u l t sI￿nd are as follows. I consider
￿rst the case in which the discount factor, identical for all ￿rms, is randomly and inde-
pendently drawn every period. I characterize the maximum symmetric tacit collusion
prices and pro￿ts that can be supported in an environment in which ￿rms are identical
and they compete repeatedly on either price or quantity. The three main results derived
from this characterization, with the third one the most interesting, are as follows.
First, the higher the discount factor in a given period, the higher the collusive prices
and pro￿ts that can be supported in equilibrium in that period. The intuition behind
this is straightforward: the higher the discount factor, the stronger the threat of future
price wars and the higher prices and pro￿ts can be without ￿rms deviating.
Second, the greater the probability of high discount factors, the higher the collusive
prices and pro￿ts that can be supported in equilibrium. Again the intuition is straight-
forward. From the ￿rst result we know that the higher the realization of the discount
factor, the higher collusive prices and pro￿ts will be. Hence, a shift in the distribution
function to higher discount factors would result in an increase in the expected value
of collusive pro￿ts and an increase in the threat of future punishment, allowing higher
equilibrium prices and pro￿ts.
Third and more interestingly, I show that the higher the volatility of the discount
factor, the lower the collusive prices and pro￿ts that can be supported in equilibrium.
The reason for this is twofold. First, given that the combination of the incentive com-
patibility and feasibility constraint results in a concave collusive pro￿tf u n c t i o n( a sa
function of the discount factor), an increase in volatility leads to a decrease in expected
3pro￿ts. Second, this decrease in expected pro￿ts reduces the size of future punishment
and hence results in a decrease in equilibrium pro￿ts and prices. This volatility eﬀect
is not secondary to the ￿rst two level eﬀects. I show that it plays an important role in
determining collusive prices and pro￿ts.
It is important to note that allowing for the more realistic case of positively correlated
discount factors will not aﬀect the main results per se, given that both a high discount
factor today and in the future make it easy to support collusion.
Two other results of this paper are worth noting. First, I show that under quantity
competition the optimal symmetric punishment has a simple stick-and-carrot character-
ization (the punishment takes only one period and is as big as possible in equilibrium),
extending the results of Abreu [1] from the ￿xed discount factor case.
Second, I show that under price competition an increase in the number of ￿rms
reduces collusive prices and pro￿ts. The reason is that the greater the number of ￿rms
the greater the share of the market that can be captured by a deviation, and, hence, the
lower equilibrium pro￿ts and prices must be to avoid deviations. In the case of quantity
competition, more work is needed to assess the validity of this result, since not only
do the incentives to deviate change with the number of ￿rms, but so may the threat of
future punishment.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I relate this paper to the
previous literature. In Sections 3 and 4, I study optimal tacit collusion under price and
quantity competition, respectively. In Section 5, I analyze some extensions to the basic
model. In Section 6, I conclude.
2To my knowledge, the eﬀect of the number of ￿rms on tacit collusive prices under quantity compe-
tition remains to be solved also for the case of ￿xed discount factors.
42 Related literature
The related literature falls into six categories: 1) studies of the eﬀects of demand ￿uctu-
ations on optimal tacit collusion, 2) customer markets and oligopolistic pricing, 3) em-
pirical studies of collusive pricing, 4) studies of the role of oligopolies in macroeconomic
￿uctuations, 5) studies of optimal punishment schemes under quantity competition, and
6) repeated games with ￿xed discount factors.
Demand ￿uctuations and optimal tacit collusion:T h ew e l lk n o w np a p e rb yR o t e m -
berg and Saloner [22] oﬀers interesting results with respect to tacit collusion that also
follow from changes in the relative importance of present and future pro￿ts. In their
paper, however, those changes are driven by changes in demand, not the discount factor.
This diﬀerence in the source of the changes in the relative importance of future and
present pro￿ts is not trivial and leads to signi￿cantly diﬀerent results.
First, in this paper an increase in the discount factor always has a nonnegative eﬀect
on the equilibrium price, while in Rotemberg and Saloner [22] an increase in demand
may result in either an increase or a decrease in price. In their model, the threat of a
future price war, which depends on the expectation of future equilibrium pro￿ts, results
in an upper bound to equilibrium collusive pro￿ts. Hence, at this upper bound on
pro￿ts, increases in demand do not result in increases in pro￿ts but a decrease in prices.
If instead the demand is so low that the upper bound to pro￿ts is not binding, a small
increase in demand will result in an increase in prices. In addition, contrary to discount
factor ￿uctuations, the eﬀect of demand ￿uctuations on prices may not be robust to
assuming quantity competition instead of price competition, as Rotemberg and Saloner
[22] note, or to the existence of capacity constraints, as Staiger and Wolak [26] note.
Second, while in this paper an increase in the volatility of the discount factor always
results in a decrease in pro￿ts and prices, in Rotemberg and Saloner￿s model an increase
in the volatility of demand is again ambiguous -it may result in an increase in pro￿ts and
5prices.3 Therefore, in contrast to ￿uctuating demand, changes in the level or volatility
of the discount factor have unambiguous eﬀects.
The third diﬀerence between the two models lies in the eﬀect that present and future
shocks have on collusive prices. In Rotemberg and Saloner￿s model, a high demand
today makes it diﬃcult to support collusion since it oﬀers greater incentives to deviate,
while a high demand in future periods makes it easy to collude today given that a future
price war becomes a bigger threat. In contrast, in this model both high discount factors
today and in the future make it easy to support collusion given that both increase the
threat of future punishment.
The diﬀerent eﬀects that present and future levels of demand have on collusive pricing
in Rotemberg and Saloner [22] led to several studies of whether their results were robust
to correlation on demand shocks. Kandori [16] ￿nds conditions under which demand
correlation does not aﬀect the result of countercyclical collusive pricing. Haltiwanger and
Harrington [14] study tacit collusion under deterministic cyclic ￿uctuations of demand
and ￿nd that higher collusive prices can be supported when demand is increasing than
when it is decreasing. Bagwell and Staiger [3] study tacit collusion when demand shifts
stochastically between high and low growth rates and ￿nd that collusive prices are higher
for high rates of demand growth if demand growth rates are positively correlated through
time.
Under discount factor ￿uctuations, the issue of positive correlation is less important
than under demand ￿uctuations, given that both high discount factors today and in the
future increase today￿s collusive prices. However, I show that the discount factor volatil-
ity may be important in understanding how more general discount factor ￿uctuations
aﬀect the basic results.
3Rotemberg and Saloner [22] do not provide this comparative static result but straightforward ex-
amples can be obtained from their model. In their model the pro￿t function may be convex in the
￿uctuating parameter so that an increase in volatility increases the expected pro￿ts and moves up the
incentive compatibility constraint.
6Customer markets and oligopolistic pricing: There are other environments in which
changes in the discount factor may aﬀect oligopoly prices. In models of customer mar-
kets, as in Phelps and Winter [19] and Gottfries [13], and models of competition when
consumers have switching costs, as in Klemperer [17] and Chevalier and Scharfstein [8],
￿rms face a trade-oﬀ between charging high prices to extract the surplus from current
customers and charging low prices to attract new customers (whose surplus can be ex-
tracted later). In these models an increase in the discount factor increases the incentives
to invest in new customers and results in lower prices, as Rotemberg and Woodford￿s
[23] and Klemperer [17] note. In contrast, in the model of tacit collusion presented here,
an increase in the discount factor results in higher prices. The higher the discount fac-
tor, the stronger the threat of future price wars and the higher the prices that can be
supported in equilibrium.
Empirical literature on collusive pricing: Based on the frameworks established by
Rotemberg and Saloner [22] or Porter [20] and Green and Porter [12], there is an extensive
literature that concentrates on changes in demand as sources of changes in collusive
pricing. Those papers do not include the interest rate in their studies, see for example
Porter [21], Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen [9], Slade [25], Ellison [10] and Borenstein
and Shepard [5].4 An exception can be found in Rotemberg and Woodford￿s [23] study
of markups and the economic cycle. Working with aggregate log-linearized data around
the steady state of an intertemporal macroeconomics model, they use rates of return
to ￿instrument￿ for the ￿rm￿s expectations of future pro￿ts and ￿nd that high interest
rates result in low markups. In this paper I present additional comparative static results
arising from interest rate movements that may be used in empirical studies of collusive
pricing.
Collusive pricing and macroeconomic ￿uctuations: Previous literature has related
tacit collusive pricing with macroeconomic ￿uctuations. For example, Rotemberg and
Saloner [22] present a simple two-sector general equilibrium model in which one sector
4For a review of empirical studies up to the 1980s see Bresnahan [6].
7is oligopolistic and the other one is perfectly competitive. They show that exogenous
shifts in demand towards the oligopolistic sector induce a decrease in collusive prices
(since it increases the short run incentives to deviate) and may result in an increase in
aggregate production. Rotemberg and Woodford [24] present a real business cycle model
with tacitly colluding oligopolistic producers. In their model, an increase in government
expenditure raises the short run incentives to deviate and results in a decrease in collusive
prices. This, in turn, increases real wages, employment and output. In addition, the
authors note that the increase in government expenditure may result in an increase in
interest rates (since consumers must postpone consumption), which reinforces the ￿rst
eﬀect by lowering the threat of future punishments.
In this paper I present another way in which tacit collusion may result in aggregate
￿uctuations. Any change in policy, technology or preferences may have an impact on
aggregate production through changes in collusive behavior, not only by aﬀecting the
real interest rate level, but also by aﬀecting its volatility.
Optimal punishment schemes under quantity competition: Abreu [1] provides a simple
stick-and-carrot characterization of optimal symmetric punishments for a ￿xed discount
factor under quantity competition: ￿...the most eﬃcient way to provide low payoﬀs, in
terms of incentives to cheat, is to combine a grim present with a credibly rosy future.￿5
In this paper I show that the stick-and-carrot characterization extends to the case of
discount factor ￿uctuations, with both the size of the stick and the size of the carrot
depending on the realization of the discount factor.
The level eﬀect and repeated games with ￿xed discount factors:I ti sw e l lk n o w nt h a t ,
for repeated games with ￿xed discount factors, the higher the discount factor, the bigger
the set of equilibrium outcomes will be (see for example, Abreu, et al. [2]). In this paper
I show that under discount factor ￿uctuations it is not only the level of the discount
factor that matters, but also its volatility.
5Abreu [1], pg. 206.
83 Price competition
Consider a market with N identical ￿rms with a constant marginal cost of c and facing a
demand function D(p) (D0(p) < 0). Firms compete repeatedly on price and the demand
is divided equally among the ￿rms charging the lowest price in each period. Firms only
care about pro￿ts and are risk neutral and, hence, their objective is to maximize the
discounted stream of pro￿ts. The distinctive feature of this model is that the discount
factor δt, which discounts earnings from t +1to t, is a continuous, independent and
identically distributed random variable, between a and b, with p.d.f. f(δt) and c.d.f.
F(δt).
The timing of the game in a given period t is as follows: the ￿rms observe the
realization of the discount factor, δt, then they choose the price for that period and ￿nally
they observe the market clearing price, quantities and payoﬀs. All the characteristics of
the environment are common knowledge.
Given that ￿rms cannot commit to charge a given price or sign contracts amongst
themselves or with third parties regarding prices, any equilibrium of the model must be
a subgame perfect equilibrium of the in￿nitely repeated oligopoly game. I restrict my
attention to equilibria in which all the ￿rms charge the same price p. In this symmetric
case, I can write the pro￿ts of each ￿rm as π(p)=
(p−c)D(p)
N and total industry pro￿ts
as Π(δ)=( p − c)D(p). I assume that there exists a price pm that maximizes the
total industry pro￿ts, that is, pm is the monopoly (or perfect collusion) price. Denote
πm = π(pm) as the monopoly pro￿tp e r￿rm.
3.1 Optimal tacit collusion with a random discount factor
It is well known that in repeated oligopoly games, prices above the marginal cost can be
supported in equilibrium if any price undercutting triggers future price wars. In the case
of price competition, the best price war, in terms of punishment, is the reversion forever
to the Bertrand equilibrium after any deviation. This punishment gives a discounted
9payoﬀ of zero. Any other punishments that would result in a lower payoﬀ are not
enforceable given that any ￿rm can make sure to earn zero pro￿ts by charging a price
equal to the marginal cost in every period.
Given this punishment, I look for symmetric optimal tacit collusion strategies -
strategies without price diﬀerences among ￿rms and that in equilibrium support the
maximum present value of pro￿ts. Since the environment in which the ￿rms interact
does not change over time, with the exception of the discount factor, the optimal tacit
collusion solution will consist of the highest equilibrium price that the ￿rms can charge
in a period given the discount factor in that period. Therefore the solution will consist
of a function p∗(δ):[ a,b] → [c,pm] which gives the highest equilibrium price that can be
supported for each discount factor. This in turn de￿nes a function π∗(δ):[ a,b] → [0,πm],
which denotes the optimal tacit collusion equilibrium pro￿ts as a function of the period
discount factor.
Fortunately, in the search for the optimal tacit collusion behavior it is enough to
work with π∗(δ). As we see in Figure 1, a given level of pro￿ts, for example π1,c a n
result from diﬀerent prices, such as p1 and p2. Given that I am interested in the optimal
levels of pro￿ts that can be supported under tacit collusion and the fact that π1 may be
supported more easily by p1 than by p2,6 I only consider the increasing part of the pro￿t
function. In this way, for every pro￿tl o w e rt h a nπm corresponds one and only one price
lower than pm.T h e r e f o r e , I c a n d e ￿ne the function φ(π)=π−1(π):[ 0 ,πm] → [c,pm],
a n do n c eIs o l v ef o rπ∗(δ), I can recover p∗(δ) as p∗(δ)=φ(π∗(δ)). Note that φ(π) is
increasing on π.7
6As it will be clear soon, π1 c a nb es u p p o r t e dm o r ee a s i l yb yp1 than by p2 since the optimal
deviation from p1 yields Nπ(p1) which is lower than Nπ(pm) which can be obtain deviating from p2.








Figure 1: The pro￿t function
Given the simplicity of the optimal punishment (reversion to Bertrand) and the fact
that we are able to uniquely relate pro￿ts to prices, I concentrate on the characterization
of the equilibrium optimal tacit collusion pro￿ts π∗(δ) without relying on the strategies
that result in that equilibrium path. I study next the restriction on collusive pro￿ts for
then characterizing the optimal tacit collusion solution.
Using the recursiveness of the problem, the present value at t of a ￿rm stream of





where π(δt) denotes the pro￿ts that the ￿rms receive at time t if the discount








π(δt)f(δt)dδt,w h e r eδ is the expected value of δt. Plugging this into (1), the







Since these ￿rms cannot commit to a given price, in equilibrium they must be un-
11willing to charge a price diﬀerent from the equilibrium price. How much can a ￿rm gain
from deviating? If all the ￿rms are charging the same price above marginal cost, a single
company can decrease its price by a penny and capture the whole market. Therefore, if
the equilibrium pro￿ti sπ(δt), a single company can gain (N − 1)π(δt) by deviating (if
we forget about pennies). For ￿rms to be unwilling to deviate, punishment must follow
a deviation. How much can a ￿rm lose from being punished? As described before, the
best punishment is to revert forever to the Bertrand equilibrium (the Nash equilibrium
of the one stage game). Under this threat if one ￿rm deviates it will earn the total
industry pro￿t the period of deviation but then it will earn zero pro￿ts forever. Then,










In addition, the pro￿ts per ￿rm cannot be greater than under monopoly pricing:
π(δt) ≤ π
m (4)
Therefore it is clear that under the optimal symmetric tacit collusion equilibrium ￿rms
will choose pro￿ts as large as possible without violating the incentive compatibility
constraint (3) and the feasibility constraint (4).8 Then, dropping the subindexes for
simplicity, the optimal tacit collusion pro￿ts levels π∗(δ) is a function from [a,b] to























Note that this equation does not provide the optimal tacit collusion pro￿ts since π∗(δ)
appears in both sides of it. Equation (5) is just a necessary condition for optimal tacit
8It could be argued that that is not necessary since having pro￿ts lower than possible in a ￿nite
subset does not aﬀect the expected value. But if we want the solution to be independent of the discount
factor of the ￿rst period, pro￿ts must be as high as possible for every possible value of the discount
factor.
12collusion. In fact, choosing pro￿ts equal to zero for every discount factor solves this
equation. From the possible many solution to equation (5), the one that provides the
highest pro￿t for each discount factor is the optimal tacit collusion solution: π∗(δ).T h e
following proposition fully characterizes the function π∗(δ).
Proposition 1 The function π∗(δ) depends on f(δ) and N in the following way:
1)i fδ ≥ 1 − a
N−1, π∗(δ)=πm;
2) if N−1
N ≤ δ < 1 − a
N−1, π∗(δ)=πm for δ ≥ b δ and π∗(δ)=δ
b δπm for δ < b δ,f o ra




3) if δ < N−1
N , π∗(δ)=0 .
Proof. Case 1): δ ≥ 1 − a
N−1 implies that πm ≤ a
(N−1)(1−δ)πm ≤ δ
(N−1)(1−δ)πm ∀δ
and perfect collusion, π∗(δ)=πm, can be supported for every discount factor.
Case 2): Consider the case in which the two terms inside the brackets in equation
(5) are binding for diﬀerent ranges of δ. Given that the ￿rst term is increasing in δ,i t
would be binding for δ < b δ, the second term would be binding for δ > b δ, and both terms
equal and binding for δ = b δ,w h e r eb δ ∈ [a,b]. In this case, integrating over equation (5)
















In addition, given that for δ = b δ both terms of equation (5) are equal, the expected
pro￿t can be also written as:
A =












F(δ)dδ,t h en u m b e rb δ solves the following equation:








13It remains to be shown that, under the conditions of case 2), the number b δ that solves













N < δ < 1− a









− δ < 0. In addition, H(r) is continuous and strictly
decreasing (
∂H(r)
∂r = F(r) − 1 < 0 for a ≤ r<b ). Then, there exists a unique number b δ,




=0 .I fδ = N−1
N , H(b)=0and b δ = b is the unique
solution since H(.) is strictly decreasing.
Case 3): From the analysis of the previous two cases follows that when δ < min
'
N−1
N ,1 − a
N−1
“
neither a solution with perfect collusion for all or some discount factors is feasible, nor a
solution with imperfect collusion is feasible. Then, the only possible solution to equation
(5) is π∗(δ)=0 .S i n c eN−1
N can be greater than 1 − a
N−1 only if a>N−1
N ,i nw h i c hc a s e
δ can never be lower than N−1
N , it follows that π∗(δ)=0if δ < N−1
N .
Proposition 1 shows that, depending on the distribution of the discount factor and
the number of ￿rms, there are three mutually exclusive cases that result in three diﬀerent
types of optimal tacit collusion. In case 1), δ ≥ 1 − a
N−1, any possible realization of the
discount factor is high enough for each ￿rm to value the future monopoly pro￿ts more
t h a nt h eo n es t a g ep r o ￿ts of deviation, and, hence, perfect collusion is an equilibrium
for any discount factor. On the contrary, in case 3), δ < N−1
N , all the realizations of the
discount factor are too low to be able to support any level of collusion. In between these
two cases, case 2), perfect collusion can be supported for a range of high realizations of
the discount factor while only lower levels of pro￿ts can be supported for a range of low
realizations. The reason for this is that while for low discount factors it is not possible
to support full collusion, it may still be possible to satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint by reducing the present incentives to deviate. For this, the present pro￿ts
should be lowered so that no ￿rm has an incentive to deviate. In this case, an increase
in the discount factor results in an increase in the optimal tacit collusion pro￿ts and,
hence, in prices. Given that in the other two cases changes in the discount factor have
no eﬀect on pro￿ts, the next theorem follows.
14Theorem 2
dπ∗(δ)
dδ ≥ 0 and
dp∗(δ)
dδ ≥ 0.9
Note that the characterization of optimal tacit collusion under discount factor ￿uc-
tuations includes the case of a ￿xed discount factor. For the ￿xed discount factor case,
a = b, Proposition 1 coincides with the text book solution: perfect collusion if δ ≥ N−1
N
and no collusion otherwise.
3.2 The eﬀects of changes in f(δ)
The characterization of the optimal tacit collusion equilibrium leads to interesting com-
parative statics results with respect to changes in the distribution function of the discount
factor: 1) the higher the probability of high discount factors, the higher the equilibrium
prices and pro￿ts, and 2) the higher the volatility of the discount factor, the lower the
equilibrium prices and pro￿ts.
As an intermediate step to these results, I study ￿rst how changes in the distribution
function modify the range of perfect collusion under case 2) of Proposition 1. For a
cumulative distributions functions F de￿ne δF as the expected discount factor and b δF
as the solution limit to perfect collusion if case 2) applies.
Lemma 3 Consider two cumulative distributions functions, F and G,s u c ht h a tN−1
N <
δF,G < 1 − a
N−1 and F second-order stochastically dominates10 G,t h e nb δF ≤ b δG.











F(δ)dδ−b δF =0 .






G(δ)dδ and δF ≥ δG. Therefore,
9I omit straightforward proofs.
10For two cumulative distributions functions F(δ) and G(δ), F second-order stochastic dominates






G(δ)dδ, and the inequality is strict in some range. In that






u(δ)g(δ)dδ, for any increasing concave












G(δ)dδ − b δF ≥ 0 and, given that HG(.) is strictly












F(δ) as the optimal tacit collusion pro￿t, it￿s expected value
and optimal collusion prices under F, respectively.
Theorem 4 Consider two cumulative distribution functions, F and G, such that F





every δ. In addition, Eπ∗
F ≥ Eπ∗
G.
Proof. By second-order stochastic dominance δF ≥ δG. So, from Proposition 1,
we can see that if the solution under F belongs to case 1), the solution under G can
belong to any of the three cases. If the solution under F belongs to case 2), the solution
under G can belong to cases 2) or 3). And if the solution under F belongs to case
3), the solution under G must belong to the same case. For most of this combinations
it is straight forward to see that π∗
F(δ) ≥ π∗
G(δ) for every δ. The situation in which
both the solution under F as under G belong to case 2) needs more analysis. Since
F second-order stochastically dominates G, by Lemma 3, b δF ≤ b δG. Then, π∗
F(δ)=
δ
b δF πm ≥ π∗
G(δ)= δ




b δGπm, if the incentive compatibility constraint binds for G but
not for F,a n dπ∗
F(δ)=π∗
G(δ)=πm if it is not binding for any of the two. Therefore,
π∗
F(δ) ≥ π∗
G(δ) for every δ.
The result with respect to prices follows directly from the positive relationship be-
tween pro￿ts and prices.
Note that π∗
F(δ) is increasing and concave, hence, by second-order stochastic domi-
nance and π∗
F(δ) ≥ π∗















16The intuition of this result becomes clear if we consider two particular cases of second
order stochastic dominance: when F ￿rst-order stochastically dominates11 G and when
G i sam e a np r e s e r v i n gs p r e a do fF.
From Theorem 2 we know that given a distribution of the discount factor, say G,
equilibrium prices and pro￿ts are increasing in the realization of the discount factor.
Then, a shift in the distribution function to higher values (which yields a cumulative
distribution function F that ￿rst-order stochastically dominates G), would result in an
increase in expected pro￿ts. This, in turn, increases the threat of future punishments
and increases equilibrium prices an pro￿ts.





G(δ) for every δ. In addition, Eπ∗
F ≥ Eπ∗
G.
From Proposition 1 we know that given a distribution factor, say F, the optimal tacit
collusion pro￿t function is concave in the discount factor. Therefore, a mean preserving
spread (which yields G), would result in a reduction in expected pro￿ts. This, in turn,
reduces the threat of future punishment and results in lower equilibrium prices and
pro￿ts.





G(δ) for every δ. In addition, Eπ∗
F ≥ Eπ∗
G.
Therefore, the volatility of the discount factor is inversely related to the ￿rms￿ pro￿ts.
This result might seem somewhat counterintuitive given that the ￿rms are risk neutral,
but the intuition is in fact simple. The combination of the incentive compatibility
constraint with the feasibility constraint yields a pro￿t function which is concave in the
11For two cumulative distributions functions F(δ) and G(δ), F ￿rst-order stochastic dominates G if
for all r, a ≤ r ≤ b, F(r) ≤ G(r), and the inequality is strict in some range. In that case, it can be






u(δ)g(δ)dδ, for any increasing
piecewise diﬀerential function u(δ). See Hirshleifer and Riley [15].
17discount factor even when ￿rms are risk neutral. Hence, an increase in volatility reduces
expected pro￿ts reducing the threat of future punishment and lowering equilibrium prices
and pro￿ts.
Note that this result does not depend on the ￿rms not having access to insurance
against discount factor ￿uctuations. Even if they could buy actuarially fair insurance,
an increase in the volatility of the discount factor would reduce the pre-insurance expec-
tation of pro￿ts and, hence, the ￿xed amount that a ￿r mc o u l de a r nw i t hi n s u r a n c e .
In addition, the assumption that the ￿rm wants to maximize the present value of
pro￿ts is not crucial for this result. It is usually assumed that managers behave as risk
neutral and maximize the present value of pro￿ts even if they are risk averse because
in simple environments this results in the largest budget set possible. This may not
hold under interest rate ￿uctuations. But if it is not optimal for risk averse managers to
behave as risk neutral, then the negative eﬀect of volatility on collusive pro￿ts can only
increase.
3.3 The eﬀects of changes in the number of ￿rms
With N ￿rms in the market a single ￿rm may steal a fraction N−1
N of the market by
undercutting the price. Since this fraction is increasing in the number of ￿rms, the
higher the number of ￿rms the higher is the present pro￿t from deviation for a given
pro￿t, and the more diﬃcult it will be to support collusion. In fact, it can be easily seen
from Proposition 1 that for any distribution of the discount factor, there is large enough
number of ￿rms above which it is not possible to support any collusion.12 De￿ne π∗
N(δ)
12It is interesting to note that this result does not depend on ￿xing the size of the market while
changing the number of ￿r m s .I fb o t ht h es i z eo ft h em a r k e ta n dt h en u m b e ro f￿rms increase in the
same proportion (that would consists on multiplying the demand function D(p) and the number of
￿rms N by a positive integer), the same result holds. Since an increase in the number of ￿rms and size
of the market leaves monopoly pro￿ts per ￿rm unchanged but increases the incentives to deviate, the
scope of collusion diminishes up to a point in which it disappears.
18and p∗
N(δ) as the optimal tacit collusion pro￿ts and prices for N ￿rms.
Theorem 7 If N> 1
1−δ,t h e nπ∗
N(δ)=0and p∗
N(δ)=c.
In addition, it can be easily shown that increases in the number of ￿rms reduce
prices and pro￿ts (at both industry and ￿rm levels). The next theorem follows from
restatement Proposition 1 in terms of industry pro￿ts Π∗
N and noting that the range of
perfect collusion in case 2) shrinks with increases in the number of ￿rms.




N (δ) ≥ π∗
M (δ) and p∗
N (δ) ≥ p∗
M (δ) for every δ.
3.4 Example with uniform distributions
The particular case in which the discount factor is distributed uniformly between a and
b, 0 ≤ a<b≤ 1, provides clear examples of the previous results.
In the uniform case, taking into consideration that δ = a+b
2 , I can restate Proposition
1 in the following way:
Proposition 9 If δ ∼ U(a,b), the function π∗(δ) depends on a, b and N in the following
way:




N − a ≤ b<2 − aN+1
N−1, π∗(δ)=πm for δ ≥ b δ and π∗(δ)=δ
b δπm for δ < b δ,
with b δ = b −
p
N(b2 − a2) − 2(b − a)(N − 1);
3) if b<
2(N−1)
N − a, π∗(δ)=0 .
Therefore, in the case of uniform distribution of the discount factor, the level of pro￿ts
for each discount factor depends on the magnitudes of a, b and N.I fb ≥ 2−aN+1
N−1 perfect
collusion can be supported for any realization of the discount factor. If
2(N−1)
N −a ≤ b<
2−aN+1
N−1, perfect collusion can be supported only for high discount factors and only lower
19levels of pro￿ts can be supported for lower discount factors. Finally, if b<
2(N−1)
N − a
no collusion can be supported.
Figure 2 shows the diﬀerent ranges of a and b for the three cases of tacit collusion
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Figure 2: Ranges of tacit collusion
Since b>a , the relevant portion of the ￿gure is above the 45 degree line. That part
of the graph shows the ranges of a and b that result in diﬀerent kinds of tacit collusion.
For example, to the northeast of the solid black line are the combinations of a and b that
results in perfect collusion (case 1) when there are two ￿rms in the market. Between the
solid and dashed black lines we see the combinations that result in perfect collusion for
high discount factors and imperfect collusion for low discount factors (case 2), and below
the dashed black line are the combinations that cannot support any collusion (case 3).
Consider the distributions of δ r e p r e s e n t e di nF i g u r e2b yt h ep o i n t sA, B and C
(the discount factor is distributed U(0.4,1), U(0.4,0.65) and U(0.4,0.5), respectively).
Each of the points falls in a diﬀerent region and hence will result in a diﬀerent tacit
collusion solution. The distribution denoted by point A results in perfect collusion, the
distribution denoted by point B results in perfect collusion for high discount factors and
20imperfect collusion of lower discount factors and the distribution denoted by C results
in no collusion at all. There are two additional things to note from this example. First,
pro￿ts are (weakly) increasing in the realization of the discount factor, as Theorem 2
proves. While for A and C the tacit collusion pro￿ts do not depend on the realization of
the discount factor, for B increases in realization of the discount factor may result in an
increase of pro￿ts and prices. Second, the ￿more to the right￿ the distribution function
is, the higher pro￿ts and prices are. Figure 3 shows that pro￿ts under A are larger than









































Figure 3: The eﬀect of levels
Consider now the distribution function denoted by point D in Figure 2, U(0.5,0.55).
This distribution function has the same expected value but a lower volatility than the
distribution function denoted by point B.W ec a ns e ef r o mF i g u r e2t h a ti ft h e r ea r eo n l y
two ￿rms in the market, perfect collusion can be supported at point D, while perfect
c o l l u s i o nc a no n l yb es u p p o r t e df o rar a n g eo fh i g hd i s c o u n tf a c t o r sf o rp o i n tB.F i g u r e4
shows the tacit collusion pro￿t functions for these two cases as a percentage of monopoly
pro￿ts per ￿rm. Consistent with Corollary 6, Figure 4 shows that a mean preserving
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D (0.5, 0.55)
B (0.4, 0.65)
Figure 4: The eﬀect of volatility
To make clear that the volatility eﬀect is not a second order eﬀect consider the
distributions denoted by point E in Figure 2, U(0.1,1). This distribution has a higher
expected discount factor than the distribution denoted by point D b u ti ta l s oh a sa
higher volatility. Figure 5 shows that the distribution function with the highest expected
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Figure 5: Volatility matters
Figure 6 shows the limits to the three cases of tacit collusion for N =2 , 4, 8 and 16.
We see that the greater the number of ￿rms, the smaller the set of distribution functions














Figure 6: Ranges of tacit collusion for diﬀerent N
Consider now the distribution of δ represented in Figure 6 by point E: the discount
factor is distributed U(0.52,1). From Figure 6, we see that perfect collusion can be
supported if N =2 , while perfect collusion can only be supported for a range of high
discount factors if N =4 , and cannot be supported at all for N =8 .F i g u r e7s h o w st h e
tacit collusion industry pro￿ts (as a percentage of industry monopoly pro￿t) for these


















































Figure 7: Tacit collusion and the number of ￿rms
234 Quantity Competition
In this section I show that, under certain assumptions, the three main results that hold
under price competition also hold under quantity competition. Namely, ￿rst, the higher
the discount factor in a period, the higher the collusive prices and pro￿ts in that period,
second, the higher the probability of high discount factors, the higher the collusive
prices and pro￿ts, and third, the higher the volatility of the discount factor, the lower
the collusive prices and pro￿ts that can be supported in equilibrium.
However, to prove this I have to characterize the optimal punishment scheme, which
was not necessary under price competition. This is interesting because I show that,
while punishment schemes can be extremely complex under quantity competition, the
optimal punishment has a simple stick-and-carrot characterization.
I consider the same model of section 2 with one main diﬀerence: ￿rms compete on
quantities. In addition, and only for the sake of generality, I also assume that ￿rms have
a continuous and diﬀerentiable cost function c(q) instead of the linear cost of section 2.
As in section 2, I restrict my attention to symmetric equilibria: all the ￿rms produce
a tag i v e np e r i o dt h es a m eq u a n t i t yq. In this symmetric case, I can write the pro￿ts
of each ￿rm as π(q)=P (Nq)q − c(q) and total industry pro￿ts as Π(δ)=Nπ(q).I
assume that there exists a quantity qm that maximizes the total industry pro￿ts, that
is the perfect collusion quantity (qm would be the Nth part of a monopolist optimal
production if there are no ￿xed cost per factory and increasing returns to scale). Denote
πm = π(qm) as the perfect collusion pro￿tp e r￿rm.
4.1 Optimal tacit collusion with a random discount factor
In the case of quantity competition the Cournot reversion is not necessarily the best
available punishment since it may be possible to generate subgame perfect threats that
lower the pro￿ts below the Cournot level. Therefore, to characterize the optimal tacit
collusion solution it is also necessary to de￿ne the optimal punishment scheme. In this
24section I characterize the optimal equilibrium punishment and collusion under certain
assumptions. The ￿rst assumption is that there exists a symmetric Cournot equilibrium.
Assumption 1: There exists a quantity qc that is the unique symmetric Cournot
equilibrium.
In this equilibrium each ￿rm earns a pro￿to fπc and it can be proven that πm > πc,
and qm <q c.
The second assumption concerns the pro￿ts from deviation. In the case of quantity
competition, if N − 1 ￿rms are each producing a quantity q, the remaining ￿rm can
obtain at most a pro￿to fπd(q)=m a x
s≥0
{P (s +( N − 1)q)s − c(s)} by producing some
other quantity. The second simplifying assumption establishes that both πd(q) an π(q)
are decreasing with the former having a bigger slope than the latter, in absolute terms,
for quantities below qc while the opposite occurs for quantities above qc.
Assumption 2: For q ∈ [qm,q c), dπd
dq < dπ
dq < 0 and for q ∈ (qc,+∞), dπ
dq < dπd
dq ≤ 0.
These assumptions are valid, for example, in a market with a linear demand function
and constant marginal cost. In addition, in the linear case there is a unique quantity
that maximizes industry pro￿ts (qm) and a unique and symmetric Cournot equilibrium
(qc). Hence there is no contradiction between the assumptions made in this section.13
As in section 2, the optimal symmetric tacit collusion equilibrium can be character-
ized by the maximum level of pro￿ts per ￿rm that can be supported for each discount
factor, which I denote π∗(δ):[ a,b] → [πc,πm], abusing notation from section 2. Since
assumption 2 ensures that there is a one to one relationship between pro￿ts and quan-
tities produced in the relevant range, once π∗(δ) is obtained, the optimal tacit collusion
quantities q∗(δ):[ a,b] → [qm,q c] are also obtained. From the demand function we can
obtain the optimal tacit collusion pro￿ts p∗(δ)=P(Nq∗(δ)).14
13In addition, these assumptions, as the assumption presented in the next subsection, could be ob-
tained from assumptions regarding the demand and cost functions. Since those assumptions would be
only suﬃcient ones and would not provide a better intuition I prefer to present conditions regarding
π(q) and πd(q) that yield the desired results.
14Note that this functions denote equilibrium outcomes and not strategies. The supporting strategies











In addition, the feasibility condition can be written as:
π(δ) ≤ π
m (8)
The incentive compatibility constraint diﬀers from that in the previous section since
neither the short run incentives to deviate nor the future punishments are the same.
Under price competition, a ￿rm can capture the whole market by a small price devi-
ation, obtaining (N − 1)π(δ) in pro￿ts from deviation. Under quantity competition,
the maximum pro￿t from deviation is πd (q (π(δ))) − π(δ),w h e r eq(π) is the quantity
that every ￿rm has to produce to get a per ￿rm pro￿to fπ. In addition, the possi-
ble punishment from deviation may not be the same as in price competition. In price
competition reverting to a situation of zero pro￿ts is a credible threat, since that is
the Bertrand equilibrium. Instead, under quantity competition a punishment of zero
pro￿ts forever may not be credible. What is credible depends on the biggest credible
threat. This threat would consists of punishing the deviator with the lowest equilibrium
discounted payoﬀ,d e n o t e db yV (δ), while rewarding compliance with the equilibrium
with the highest equilibrium discounted payoﬀ, denoted by V (δ), if tomorrows discount
factor is δ. Assume for now that the extreme discounted equilibrium payoﬀ functions
V (δ) and V (δ) exist, as it is proven later, and de￿ne their expected values as EV and
EV, respectively. Therefore, for π(δ) to be incentive compatible, it must be the case
that no player has incentives to deviate if conforming is rewarded with the highest possi-
ble expected continuation payoﬀ EV and deviating is punished with the lowest possible
expected continuation payoﬀ EV:
π





are not explicitly de￿ned due to their lack of peculiarities.
26For simplicity, write the left hand side of equation (9) as Φ(π(δ)) and denote EV −EV
on the right hand side of the equation as B. As such, for a given B, the incentive
compatibility constraint can be written as
Φ(π(δ)) ≤ δB ∀ δ (10)
Note that Φ(πc)=0and that Φ(π) increases as π separates from πc. Then, for a
g i v e na m o u n to ft h r e a tδB,there is a highest and lowest amount of pro￿tt h a tc a nb e
supported. Next I characterize the incentive compatible upper bound to pro￿ts, and its
interaction with the feasibility constraint, and then characterize the incentive compatible
lower bound to pro￿ts.
Lemma 10 Under Assumptions 1 a n d2 ,f o rag i v e nB, the incentive compatible upper
b o u n dt op r o ￿ts is not binding for any δ if aB > Φ(πm). If instead aB ≤ Φ(πm),t h e r e
exists a number b δ(B) ∈ [a,b] such that the upper bound can be written as π(δ) ≤ Φ
−1
+ (δB)
for δ ≤ b δ(B),w h e r eΦ
−1
+ (δB) is the inverse of Φ(π) if we restrict its domain to [πc,πm],
and it is not binding for δ > b δ(B). In addition, the incentive compatible upper bound is
increasing in δ for δ ≤ b δ(B),a n db δ(B) and Φ
−1
+ (δB) are continuous.
Proof. In Appendix.
Therefore, for low discount factors the maximum level of pro￿ts that can be supported
is bounded by the incentive compatible upper bound, while for high values it is bounded







+ (δB) if aB ≤ Φ(πm) and δ ≤ b δ(B)
πm otherwise
(11)
In the optimal symmetric tacit collusion equilibrium, ￿rms will choose pro￿ts as large
as possible given the incentive compatible upper bound and the feasibility constraint.
In addition, given that conforming with the equilibrium strategy must be rewarded with
the highest equilibrium payoﬀ, the highest equilibrium discounted payoﬀ V (δ) has a
simple relationship with the optimal tacit collusion solution. If π∗(δ) is the optimal tacit







0 and its expected value
is EV = Eπ∗
1−δ. Therefore, given the lowest expected equilibrium payoﬀ EV,t h eo p t i m a l





























The following lemma characterizes the incentive compatible lower bound to pro￿ts.
Lemma 11 Under Assumptions 1 a n d2 ,f o rag i v e nB, the incentive compatible lower
b o u n dt op r o ￿ts can be written as π(δ) ≥ Φ
−1
− (δB),w h e r eΦ
−1
− (δB) is the inverse of Φ(π)
if we restrict its domain to (−∞,πc]. In addition, the incentive compatible lower bound
is decreasing in δ,a n dΦ
−1
− (δB) is continuous.
Proof. In Appendix.
Having characterized the incentive compatible lower bound to pro￿ts, I must still
characterize the lower discounted continuation payoﬀ V (δ). I show that the optimal
punishment scheme, which yields V (δ), has a simple stick-and-carrot characterization
(the punishment takes only one period and is as big as possible in equilibrium), extending
the results of Abreu [1] from the ￿xed discount factor case.












Proof. Consider any punishment scheme consisting of a pro￿to fe π(δ) in the ￿rst
p e r i o da n da ne x p e c t e dc o n t i n u a t i o np a y o ﬀ of Ee V .D e ￿n et h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo ft h e
game in that case as e V (δ)=e π(δ)+δEe V . For this punishment scheme to be credible
it must be the case that e V (δ) ≥ πd (q(e π(δ))) + δEV.C h o o s en o w t h e￿rst payoﬀ of a
two phase punishment π0(δ) so that π0(δ)+ δ
1−δEπ∗ = e V (δ).G i v e n t h a t Eπ∗
1−δ ≥ Ee V ,
π0(δ) ≤ e π(δ) and by πd (q(.)) being increasing, e V (δ) ≥ πd (q(π0(δ))) + δEV and the two
28phase punishment is credible. Therefore any equilibrium punishment can be matched
with a two phase punishment that yields the best continuation payoﬀ in the second phase.
Then, choosing the lowest equilibrium present payoﬀ, I obtain the lowest equilibrium











Therefore, given the optimal tacit collusion solution, the lowest possible continuation
















The solution to the problem of ￿nding the optimal tacit collusion pro￿ts and the
optimal punishment that support that collusion consists of ￿nding the functions π∗(δ)
and V (δ) that solve equations (12) and (13) simultaneously and choosing the solution
with the highest expect pro￿t Eπ∗. The next proposition shows that this problem has
a unique solution.
Proposition 13 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, π∗(δ) and V (δ) exist. In addition π∗(δ)
is unique.

































In the same way, taking the expected value over (13), for any possible solution V (δ)



















Note that there is a one to one relationship between the pro￿t functions that satisfy
equation (12) and the expected values that satisfy equation (14). That is, if π∗(δ)
29satis￿es equation (12), then Eπ∗ must satisfy equation (14), and if the value Eπ∗ satis￿es
equation (14), π∗(δ) satis￿es equation (12) with Eπ∗ in the right hand side. The same
is true for equations (13) and (15). Therefore, we can ￿nd π∗(δ) and V (δ) by choosing
the solution to equations (14) and (15) with the highest Eπ∗.N o t et h a tEπ∗ = πc and
EV = πc
1−δ solve the pair of equations and, hence, there is at least one solution. Let
H(r,s)=

   






































.S i n c e




− (.),a n dF (.) are continuous, H(r,s) is also a continuous function.
Then, the set of numbers that make H(r,s)=( 0 ,0) is closed, given that the inverse
images of closed sets are closed for continuous functions. In addition it must be bounded





. Therefore, the set of solutions is non-empty, closed
and bounded. Then, among the solutions there exists one with the highest r that
gives (Eπ∗,EV). Plugging this into equations (12) and (13) we obtain π∗(δ) and V (δ).
Uniqueness is clear from the fact that there is a one to one relationship between Eπ∗
and π∗(δ).
Optimal tacit collusion must fall in one of the following three cases, depending on
which restriction is binding. First, it may be that only the feasibility constraint binds for
every discount factor. In this case, the value of the future monopoly pro￿ts outweighs the
pro￿ts from deviation, and perfect collusion is an equilibrium for any discount factor.
Second, it may be possible that the incentive compatibility constraint binds for low
discount factors while the feasibility constraint binds for high discount factors. Third,
it may be possible that the incentive compatible upper bound to pro￿ts binds for every
value of the discount factor. While in the ￿rst case changes in the discount factor do not
aﬀect pro￿t and prices, in the last two cases, an increase in the discount factor results
in an increase in collusive pro￿t and prices. The reason for this is that a higher discount
factor results in a higher threat of punishment, so that higher pro￿ts can be achieved
without ￿rms having incentives to deviate, and the next Theorem follows.
30Theorem 14 Under Assumption 1 and 2,
dπ∗(δ)
dδ ≥ 0 and
dp∗(δ)
dδ ≥ 0.
As in section 2, the equilibrium pro￿ts and prices are increasing in the discount
factor.
4.2 The eﬀects of changes in f(δ)
In section 2, the comparative static results with respect to the distribution function of the
discount factor depend on the optimal tacit collusion pro￿t function being increasing and
concave. If that is the case, shifts to the left of the distribution function or increments
in volatility reduce the expectation of future pro￿ts and result in lower equilibrium
pro￿ts and prices. Because under quantity competition the level of punishment is not
independent of the discount factor, it is not enough to look at the shape of the optimal
tacit collusion pro￿ts to obtain a comparative static result with respect the distribution
function. What is important is the shape of the threat of future punishments: V (δ) −
V (δ).
The stick-and-carrot property of the optimal punishment implies that streams of
payoﬀs leading to the highest and lowest discounted equilibrium payoﬀ diﬀer only in
the ￿rst period. As a result, the threat of future punishment is simply the maximum
diﬀerence in payoﬀs that can be supported in equilibrium in one period. Since I have
already proved that the upper bound to pro￿ts is increasing and the lower bound to
pro￿ts is decreasing, it only remains to be shown that the upper bound is concave while
the lower bound is convex. The following assumption is a suﬃcient condition for that.
Assumption 3: For q ∈ [qm,+∞), d2πd
dq2 ≥ 0 ≥ d2π
dq2.
As Assumptions 1 and 2, this assumption is valid in a market with a linear de-
mand function and constant marginal cost. Hence, there is no contradiction among the
assumptions made in this section.
Lemma 15 Under Assumptions 1-3, V (δ) − V (δ) is increasing and concave.
31Proof. In Appendix.
From the future threat being increasing and concave in the next period discount
factor, the desired comparative static result with respect to the distribution function of
the discount factor follows.
Theorem 16 Consider two cumulative distribution functions, F and G,s u c ht h a tF





every δ. In addition, EFπ∗
F ≥ EGπ∗
G.
Proof. Let V j(δ) and V j(δ), j = F,G, be the highest and lowest equilibrium dis-
counted payoﬀ under j. First, I show that EF
¡




V G(δ) − V G(δ)
¢
.
Suppose not, then EG
¡




V F(δ) − V F(δ)
¢
.S i n c eF second-order
stochastically dominates G and V G(δ) − V G(δ) is increasing and concave by Lemma
16, EF
¡








V F(δ) − V F(δ)
¢
.B u t t h e n ,
the strategies that yield π∗
G(δ) and V G(δ) under G do not violate the incentive and
feasibility constraints under F,b yΦ
−1
+ being increasing and Φ
−1







F(δ) is not an optimal tacit collusion solution under F,w h i c h
is a contradiction.
Second, given that EF
¡











G(δ) for every δ. The last two results follow from the positive relationship
between pro￿ts and prices and the relationship between F and G, respectively.
The intuition behind this results is simple. Given that the threat of future punish-
ment is increasing and concave in the discount factor, both increases in the probability
of low discount factors and increases in its volatility reduce the expected value of the
punishment and result in a reduction of collusive pro￿ts and prices.
4.3 The eﬀects of changes in the number of ￿rms
In section 2 I showed that under price competition, increases in the number of ￿rms
increase the incentives to deviate, decreasing equilibrium pro￿ts. This result may not
32be valid when ￿rms compete on quantities since not only do the incentives to deviate
change with the number of ￿rms, but so may the threat of future punishment. In fact,
the higher the number of ￿rms the easier it is to support low pro￿ts -a consequence of
which is that industry Cournot pro￿ts fall with the number of ￿rms- and the higher
the threat of punishment for deviation. Therefore, while under price competition it is
enough to study the eﬀect of the number of ￿rms on the incentives to deviate, this is
not suﬃcient under quantity competition.
While more work is needed to characterize general conditions under which increases in
the number of ￿rms decrease equilibrium pro￿ts and prices, the next subsection presents
an example of such a situation.15
4.4 Example with uniform distributions
I study next the case in which the discount factor is distributed uniformly between a
and b, 0 ≤ a<b≤ 1, and the inverse demand function -net of a constant marginal cost-
is P =1 2− Q, and I provide clear examples of the previous results.
Three diﬀerent types of optimal tacit collusion exist. If a and b are high, relative
to the number of ￿rms, perfect collusion can be supported for any realization of the
discount factor. If a and b are low, relative to the number of ￿rms, perfect collusion
cannot be supported for any realization of the discount factor, but in contrast to what
happens under price competition, some collusion can still be supported. If a and b fall
in a middle ground, perfect collusion can be supported only for high discount factors
and only lower levels of pro￿ts can be supported for low discount factors.
15T om yk n o w l e d g et h i si s s u ea l s or e m a i n st ob es o l v e df o rt h ec a s eo fa￿xed discount factor. The
closest related paper is Brock and Scheinkman [7] which studies the eﬀect of the number of ￿rms on
tacit collusion for a ￿xed discount factor, price competition and an exogenous capacity per ￿rm. They
￿nd that changes in the number of ￿rms have a non-monotone eﬀect on optimal collusive prices. Note
that the capacity is exogenous and the link to quantity competition from Kreps and Scheinkman [18]
does not apply.
33Figure 8 shows the diﬀerent ranges of a and b for the three cases of tacit collusion,














Figure 8: Ranges of tacit collusion
Since b>a , the relevant portion of the ￿gure is above the 45 degree line. That part
of the graph shows the ranges of a and b that result in diﬀerent kinds of tacit collusion.
For example, to the northeast of the solid black line are the combinations of a and b that
result in perfect collusion when there are two ￿rms in the market. Between the solid and
dashed black lines are the combinations that result in perfect collusion for high discount
factors and imperfect collusion for low discount factors, and below the dashed black line
are the combinations that cannot support perfect collusion. For example consider the
distributions depicted by points A, B and C. While A results in perfect collusion, B can
only support perfect collusion for high discount factors and lower pro￿ts for low discount
factors. Finally, C cannot support perfect collusion for any discount factor but can still

















Figure 9: Tacit collusion pro￿ts with N=2
From Figure 9 it is clear that pro￿ts are increasing in the discount factor. The
comparison between the optimal tacit collusion pro￿ts for points A and C is an example
of the result that the higher the probability of high discount factor, the higher collusive
pro￿ts and prices. The comparison between the collusive pro￿ts for points A and B is
an example of the result that the higher the volatility of the discount factor, the lower
pro￿ts and prices.
One can see the limits to the three types of tacit collusion for N =1 6in Figure 8.
For the distribution function depicted by point A, perfect collusion can be supported if
N =2 , but perfect collusion cannot be supported at all -but lower levels of collusion
can- for N =1 6 , therefore, pro￿ts must be lower in the latter case.
5E x t e n s i o n s
In this section I analyze the restrictiveness of the assumption of symmetric equilibria
and study some extensions. As an extension, I modify the assumption of independently
distributed discount factor in two ways. I consider ￿rst deterministic discount factor cy-
cles and show that increasing discount factors make easier to support collusion. Second,
I consider the case in which the distribution of tomorrow￿s discount factor depends on
35today￿s value and show that an increase in the discount factor may result in a decrease
in equilibrium prices and pro￿ts (since the increase in the discount factor may lead to
an increase in its future volatility). Finally, I study the validity of the three main results
of this paper for general repeated games.
5.1 Asymmetric equilibrium prices
In this paper I only consider symmetric equilibrium collusive prices and quantities.
This assumption may not be that restrictive given that joint overall pro￿ts to ￿rms are
generally higher when all the ￿rms charge the same price or produce the same quantity
in equilibrium. The existence of asymmetries in ￿rms￿ equilibrium collusive behavior
can only reduce prices and total industry pro￿ts, since it is the incentive compatibility
constraint of the less favored ￿rm that binds.
In addition, in the case of price competition, this asymmetry eﬀect is strengthened
by an intrinsic discontinuity of the Bertrand model. With price competition, if ￿rms
oﬀer diﬀerent prices there will be a group of ￿rms that will not provide goods to the
market and will get zero pro￿ts. These ￿rms will have large incentives to deviate. Thus,
under price competition, the impact of even small price asymmetries on the incentive
compatibility constraints can be signi￿cant.
Therefore, there is a compelling reason to restrict ourselves to symmetric equilibrium
behavior in this paper: it is the equilibria that maximizes the industry￿s total pro￿t.
Introducing asymmetries would reduce the industry￿s pro￿ts by increasing the incentives
to deviate for those less favored ￿rms that get a small share of the market.16
16Nevertheless, under quantity competition, it may be useful to allow for asymmetric behavior oﬀ the
equilibrium path. The optimal punishment schemes characterized in this paper may only be optimal
under the restriction of symmetry oﬀ the equilibrium path. It is possible that asymmetries during the
punishment stage generate bigger punishments and higher symmetric collusion, as it is the case under
a ￿xed discount factor (Abreu [1]).
365.2 Deterministic discount factor cycles
In this section I consider deterministic discount factor cycles and show that higher
collusive prices and pro￿ts can be supported when the discount factor is increasing. The
reason is simple: the higher the future discount factors, the higher future collusive pro￿ts
and the larger the threat of punishment. Hence, the higher the future discount factors,
the higher present collusive prices and pro￿ts, as the next example shows.
Example 17 An increasing discount factor facilitates collusion: For the discount factor
cycle {.55,.75,.55,.35}, price competition and two ￿rms in the market, the optimal tacit
collusion solution is represented in Figure 10 as a percentage of monopoly pro￿ts. We
can see that for δ =0 .55 the optimal tacit collusion is higher when the discount factor
is increasing (point A) than when it is decreasing (point B). Therefore, it is easier to



















Figure 10: Pro￿ts under cyclical discount factor
Under cyclical discount factor ￿uctuations, both high discount factors today and
in the future make it easy to support collusion given that both increase the threat of
future price wars. In contrast, Haltiwanger and Harrington [14] ￿nd that under cyclical
demand ￿uctuations, a high demand today makes it diﬃcult to support collusion since
it oﬀers high incentives to deviate, while high demand in future periods makes it easy
to collude today because it increases the threat of future price wars.
375.3 Correlated discount factor and the volatility eﬀect
Given that both a high discount factor today and in the future make it easy to support
collusion, allowing for the more realistic case of positively correlated discount factors
will not aﬀect the main results. But these results may be modi￿ed if changes in today￿s
discount factor aﬀect its future volatility. In this section I present an extension to the
basic model to illustrate that an increase in the discount factor does not necessarily lead
to higher collusive prices and pro￿ts if the increase in the discount factor also raises the
volatility of future discount factors. When the value of the present discount factor aﬀect
the distribution of the future discount factor, the solution to the optimization problem
cannot be found easily. Nevertheless, under price competition and a discrete distribution
of the discount factor, the problem can be solved as a linear programming problem (see
appendix)17.




4), there are two ￿rms and the monopoly pro￿tp e r￿rm is 18. The distribution
function of the discount factor depends on the past discount factor in the following way:

















Solving the linear programming problem we ￿nd that the optimal symmetric tacit





17Note that this example is not equivalent to an extension to three states of the Bagwell and Staiger [3]
model of correlated demand shocks. In that model changes in present demand growth aﬀected collusive
prices only through changes in the expectation of future growth rates. In this example, changes in
the discount factor aﬀect both expectations of future discount factors and the present valuation of
tomorrow￿s pro￿ts making the analysis more complicated.
38This example shows that an increase in the discount factor, while increasing the
expectation of the future discount factor, may still result in a reduction of pro￿ts and
prices. The reason is that not only does the expectation of future discount factors
matter, but so does its volatility. In this case, given that future discount factors have
higher volatility when δ = 3
4 than when δ = 1
2, equilibrium pro￿ts are lower under the
former than under the latter.
5.4 General normal form games
In this section I study whether the main results of this paper can be extended to gen-
eral in￿nitely repeated games with discount factor ￿uctuations. I consider an in￿nitely
repeated simultaneous move game in which the discount factor is independently and
identically distributed. As in the rest of this paper, players observe the realization of
the discount factor before choosing an action.
In this more general environment the following results regarding discount factor levels
can be shown: ￿rst, the higher the realization of the discount factor the larger the set of
equilibrium outcomes, and second, the higher the probability of high discount factors the
larger the set of equilibrium outcomes.18 In contrast, it is not true that an increase in
the volatility of the discount factor always results in a decrease in the set of equilibrium
outcomes. The next example shows that an increase in the volatility of the discount
factor may increase the set of equilibrium outcomes for some discount factors.
Example 19 An increase in volatility of the discount factor may increase the set of
equilibrium outcomes:
Consider the following stage game:
18Given that the discount factor is i.i.d., before discounting it, the threat of future punishment is
independent of the present realization of the discount factor. Hence, the higher the discount factor the
more important that threat is and the bigger the set of equilibrium outcomes. Given this ￿rst result,
shifts of the distribution function to the right result in increments in the threat of punishment and an




A5 , 5 0 , 0 - 2 , 10
B0 , 0 4 , 4 - 2 , 5
C 10, -2 5, -2 0, 0
In this stage game there is a unique Nash equilibrium (C,c), which is Pareto dom-
inated by either (A,a) or (B,b). The in￿nite repetition of the stage game opens the
possibility that these outcomes can be supported in equilibrium. Note that (A,a) yields
ah i g h e rp a y o ﬀ than (B,b) but oﬀers higher incentives to deviate. With discount factor
￿uctuations, we should expect that in the optimal symmetric equilibrium, (A,a) is played
for realization of the discount factors that are high enough, (B,b) for lower ones and,
￿nally, (C,c) when the realization of discount factor is too low to be able to support any
cooperation by the threat of future punishment. In fact, if the discount factor is dis-
tributed U(0,1), the outcomes of the optimal symmetric equilibrium are the following19:
(A,a) if δ ≥ 0.65,( B , b )i f0.13 ≤ δ < 0.65,( C , c )i fδ < 0.13, as shown in Figure 11.I n
this case the expected utility equals 3.82.
Consider now a modi￿cation of the distribution of the discount factor. From the
original U(0,1) distribution take the mass of the segment [0.45,0.55] and add it to the
area between [0.25,0.3] and [0.7,0.75].T h i sm o d i ￿cation adds volatility to the discount
factor but at the same time adds weight to the discount factors that yield a high payoﬀ.
Hence, the change in the distribution function increases the equilibrium expected utility
and relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint, increasing the set of discount factors
for which (A,a) can be supported in equilibrium. In fact, under the modi￿ed distribution
function, the outcomes of the equilibrium that maximizes the players expected utility is
the following: (A,a) if δ ≥ 0.63,( B , b )i f0.126 ≤ δ < 0.63,( C , c )i fδ < 0.126.I nt h i s
case the expected utility equals 3.97.
19The problem consists of ￿nding the minimum discount factors for which (A,a) and (B,b) can be
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Figure 11: Volatility and general games
This example shows that a mean preserving spread of the discount factor may result
in an increase on the expected payoﬀ of the players and an expansion of the set of possible
outcomes for some discount factors.
For repeated games in general it is no longer true that increases in the volatility
of the discount factor reduce the set of equilibrium outcomes. The reason is that the
maximum level of utility, as a function of the discount factor, is not necessarily a concave
function (nor is the minimum level of utility necessarily convex). As result, increases in
volatility may increase the expected equilibrium utility, increasing the threat of future
punishment. This, in turn, increases the set of outcomes that can be supported for each
discount factor.
6 Conclusions
In a repeated oligopoly, I characterized the optimal symmetric collusion under discount
factor ￿uctuations and found that collusive prices and pro￿ts increase with both present
41and future discount factor levels and decrease with discount factor volatility. These
results stress the importance that discount factor levels have on repeated games and
introduce a new element to the literature: the volatility of the discount factor.
This work has several important implications for future study. While most of the
existing empirical literature on collusive pricing has largely ignored the role of the interest
rate, this paper suggests that both the level and the volatility of the interest rate are
important determinants of collusive pricing. Thus, to be complete, future empirical work
should consider these forces.
This paper also has implications for the study of aggregate ￿uctuations. I show that
any change in policy, preferences or technology may have an impact on the aggregate
level of activity through changes in collusive behavior, not only by aﬀecting the real
interest rate, but also by aﬀecting its volatility.
Finally, it would be interesting to study extensions of this work to general repeated
games. While I show here that volatility reduces the scope for cooperation in repeated
oligopolies, I also show that this is not necessarily true for general repeated games.
Determining conditions under which higher volatility reduces the set of equilibrium
outcomes for general repeated games remains for future work.
427 Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 0 :It is straight forward to see that if aB > Φ(πm) perfect collusion







{δ | Φ(πm) ≤ δB} if Φ(πm) ≤ bB
bi fΦ(πm) >b B
If aB ≤ Φ(πm) ≤ bB there exists a number b δ(B) that makes Φ(πm)=b δ(B)B by
continuity of a linear function. If bB < Φ(πm), b δ(B)=b. Therefore, b δ(B) exists (and is
continuous).
When δ > b δ(B), the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding since πm could
be supported with even a lower discount factor. On the opposite case, when δ < b δ(B),t h e






Since Φ(π) is increasing for δ ≤ b δ(B), its inverse exists in the relevant rage and the
incentive compatibility constraint can be written as a function of δB, π(δ) ≤ Φ
−1
+ (δB),f o r
δ ≤ b δ(B).S i n c edΦ
dπ > 0, this constraint is increasing in the discount factor. Finally, given
that Φ(π) is continuous Φ
−1
+ (δB) is also continuous. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 1 :Since Φ(π) is decreasing in (−∞,πc], its inverse exists in that
range and the incentive compatibility constraint can be written as a function of δB, π(δ) ≥
Φ
−1
− (δB), which is decreasing in the discount factor. Finally, given that Φ(π) is continuous
Φ
−1
− (δB) is also continuous. ¥
Proof of Lemma 15: From the stick and carrot property of the optimal punishment,
Lemma 13, the continuation payoﬀs of both the highest and lowest equilibrium discounted









. From the characterization
of V (δ) and equation (12) we know that the shape of π∗(δ) depends on the shape of the IC+-F














dπ2 ≥ 0,a n db yL e m m a1 1 ,
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dδ ≤ 0 and Φ
−1
+ is concave. The F range of the constraint is also concave,
since it is a constant. Hence, given that the IC+-F constraint is increasing and continuous, the
IC+-F constraint is increasing and concave and so is π∗(δ). From equation 13 we know that
V (δ) is convex if Φ
−1




























dδ ≥ 0 and Φ
−1
− is decreasing and









is increasing and concave on δ. ¥
Optimal collusion and linear programming: C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h ed i s -
count factor takes in every period one of L values: δ1,δ2,..,δl,...,δL. Denote as T the transi-
43tion matrix, where tls denotes the probability that the future discount factor is δs given that
today￿s is δl.L e tV be the column vector of discounted continuation payoﬀsa n dΠ the column
vector of pro￿ts given the discount factor. De￿ne b T as the matrix for which b tls = δltls. Then,
V = Π + b TV, the incentive compatibility constraint is (N − 1)Π ≤ b TV and the feasibility
constraint is Π ≤ πm1L,w h e r e1L is a column vector of ones. Then, the optimal tacit collusion
pro￿ts result from the following problem:
maxαΠ subject to:
•
(N − 1)I − b T
‡
I − b T
·−1‚
Π ≤ 0L and Π ≤ πm1L, where α is any
non-negative row vector.
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